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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) , Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting 
authority) 
FIRST ISSUE: DID DEVELOPERS REJECTION OF VAUGHNS' 
RESCISSION EFFORT, INSISTENCE ON CONTRACT PERFORMANCE, AND 
VAUGHNS CONSENT THERETO, INCLUDING VAUGHNS' REQUEST FOR RETURN OF 
VAUGHNS' REFUND CHECK, PREVENT MUTUALLY AGREED RECISSION FROM 
OCCURRING OR ESTOP DEVELOPER FROM LATER PURPORTING TO ACCEPT 
RESCISSION? 
Applicable Standards of Appellate Review: 
(a) In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court 
construes all facts and reasonable inferences which may be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party and 
independently reviews issues of law. Citizens Awareness Now v. 
Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994); Maack v. Resource Design & 
Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) and Baumgart v. Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1993). 
(b) On appeal from a summary judgment, if it appears there 
is a material factual issue, the appellate court is compelled to 
reverse the trial courts granting of the motion. Western Farm 
Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 (Utah App. 1993). 
(c) In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, statements 
and evidentiary materials of the appellant are the only credible 
evidence and the summary judgment is sustained only if no issue 
of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned. Arrow 
Industries Inc. v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1988) . 
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(d) The trial courts statements or conclusions of law are 
accorded no deference. They are reviewed for correctness. 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation of Issue in Trial Court: 
Vaughns opposed Developers' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
132-315, 310-316) and filed two affidavits of Robert L. Vaughn 
with exhibits setting forth Developers rejection of Vaughns 
rescission effort and Vaughns consent thereto, including Vaughns 
request for a return of Vaughns' check. (R. 212-213, 233, 239-
242, 283-286, 295) 
SECOND ISSUE: DID DEVELOPER'S ACTION IN ENTERING INTO A 
CONTRACT UNDER WHICH DEVELOPER ACKNOWLEDGED VAUGHNS' LEGAL TITLE 
TO THE STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8 AND VAUGHNS ACTION IN RELIANCE 
THEREON ESTOP DEVELOPER FROM LATER DENYING VAUGHNS' LEGAL TITLE 
AS A PURPORTED BASIS FOR RESCISSION? 
Applicable Standards of Appellate Review: 
(a) See standards set forth under FIRST ISSUE above. 
(b) The legal effect of documents and the conduct of the 
parties with respect to their relationship and duties is subject 
to review under a correctness standard. See Hermes Associates v. 
Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah App. 1991) and Progressive 
Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah App. 1991). 
Preservation of Issue in Trial Court: 
Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 255-256) 
and supporting memorandum (R. 137-140) specifically presented the 
issue of the estoppel effect of the parties contract to the trial 
court* 
THIRD ISSUE: DID DEVELOPER'S ACTION IN TAKING POSSESSION OF 
AND CUTTING A ROAD THROUGH THE STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8 CONSTITUTE 
OBTAINING AND KEEPING THE BENEFIT OF THE CONTRACT - ACTION 
PRECLUDING DEVELOPER FROM PURPORTING TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT? 
Applicable Standards of Appellate Review: 
See standards set forth under FIRST and SECOND ISSUES above. 
Preservation of Issue in Trial Court: 
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Vaughns' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (R. 142-143, 311, 314,315) and Vaughns' 
Supporting Affidavit (R. 213) specifically presented the issue of 
whether Developers taking possession of and cutting a road 
through the staff portion of Vaughns' lot constituted taking the 
benefit of the contract, precluding rescission. 
FOURTH ISSUE: WERE VAUGHNS ENTITLED TO A RULING ON VAUGHNS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRESENTING THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER DEVELOPERS WERE ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE CONTRACT OR 
CLAIMING RESCISSION AND THE ISSUE OF VAUGHNS LEGAL TITLE TO THE 
STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8? 
Applicable Standards of Appellate Review: 
The propriety of dismissal of claims raises questions of law 
reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. Hunsaker v. 
State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993) and Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Preservation of Issue in Trial Court: 
Vaughns did not withdraw Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. 255-256) nor acquiesce in the trial courts failure 
to make a ruling thereon. 
FIFTH ISSUE: SHOULD THE SUBSEQUENTLY FILED QUIET TITLE 
ACTION FILED BY BOUNTIFUL CITY HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED WITH THIS 
CASE? 
Applicable Standards of Appellate Review: 
Was the trial courts refusal to consolidate an abuse of 
discretion? See Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 290 
(Utah 1964). 
Preservation of Issue in Trial Court: 
Vaughns did not withdraw Vaughns' Motion for Order that 
Subsequently Filed Action be Consolidated with this Proceeding 
(R. 369-370) nor acquiesce in the court's denial thereof. (R. 
426) 
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RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rule 56(c)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. [emphasis added] 
Rule 42(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common 
question of law or fact are pending before the court, 
it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the 
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the 
actions consolidated; and it may make such orders 
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid 
unnecessary costs or delay. 
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state 
of Utah in all actions, suits and proceedings of a 
civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, 
and in all special statutory proceedings, except as 
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or 
enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 
81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action. [emphasis added] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert L. Vaughn and G. Jeanie Vaughn, 
"Vaughns", appeal: 
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1. From a ruling and summary judgment that rescission of a 
March 9, 1994 contract between Vaughns and Defendants/Appellees, 
Kent A. Hoggan and Maple Oaks. L.C., "Developer", took place on 
August 16, 1994 and that the action of Developer thereafter in 
cutting a road up the flag portion of Vaughns' lot was based on 
Developer's assertion Vaughns owned no interest therein. 
•2. From the lower courts failure to make a ruling on 
Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
3. From the lower courts denial of Vaughns' Motion for 
Consolidation of this case with the later filed quiet title 
proceeding filed by third-party Defendant Bountiful City. 
Course of Proceedings 
On September 16, 1994 Vaughns filed a Complaint in the 
Second Judicial District Court against Developer seeking specific 
performance, damages and declaratory relief regarding the status 
of a contract between Vaughns and Developer dated March 9, 1994, 
(R. 15-21) under which Developer agreed to construct a street and 
other improvements upon the staff portion of Vaughns' flag Lot 8 
by July 1, 1994, and under which Vaughns agreed to dedicate the 
staff part of the lot as a public street. Vaughns' Complaint 
also sought a declaratory judgment concerning the question of 
Vaughns entitlement to contract rescission. (R. 1-6) 
Upon learning Vaughns had filed a complaint, Developer wrote 
a letter, (R. 308-309) which purported to accept Vaughns earlier 
rescission of the contract (R.308-309) although Developer had 
theretofore strongly resisted Vaughns rescission efforts. (R. 
212-213, 283-286, 293-303) 
Developer disagreed with Vaughns basis for rescission 
(Developer's breach of contract), and asserted Vaughns had no 
title to the "road right-of-way" nor even a "colorable claim of 
title". (R. 308) Developer asserted rescission was therefore 
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appropriate based upon mutual mistake of fact or failure of 
consideration. (R. 308-309) 
A few days later, on September 22, 1994, Developer cut a 
road up the staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8, at the same time 
cashing Vaughns $5,000.00 August 16, 1994 rescission/refund check 
that Developer had been holding. (R. 213) 
Vaughns amended Vaughns' Complaint and alleged Developers 
conduct in cutting a road-way through the right-of-way portion of 
Vaughns' Lot 8 evidenced an intent to complete the road to make 
it a public street and that such constituted legal affirmation of 
Developers' contractual responsibilities and repeated oral 
promises the Developer intended to perform the contract all of 
which estopped Developer from purporting to accept rescission and 
from rescinding, and that such action had made Vaughns 
alternative flag lot development plan impossible. (R. 10) 
Vaughns' Amended Complaint further alleged the John Doe 
Defendants which may include agents of Bountiful City interfered 
with the parties contract dated March 9, 1994 by actively 
counseling, advising or encouraging Developers to breach or 
purport to cancel or rescind the same and to deny all 
responsibility to Vaughns thereunder and to keep the sum 
Developer agreed to pay as part of the consideration for Vaughns 
making part of their Lot 8 a publicly traveled street. (R. 12-
13) 
Developer answered Vaughns' original and amended complaint, 
(R. 29-33; 22-28) and filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
judgment that the contract had been rescinded. (R. 60-62) 
Vaughns filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 255-
256) seeking a judgment that the contract had not been rescinded 
and could not be rescinded by Developer, but remained in effect. 
Vaughns asserted that Developer was estopped from claiming 
Vaughns had no right in the staff portion of Lot 8 by their 
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conduct in entering into the contract, by Vaughns reliance on the 
contract, by Developer's rejection of Vaughns' rescission effort 
and by Developers repeated promises of contract performance. (R. 
7-12, 137-140, 311-314) 
Vaughns also sought summary judgment that Vaughns own fee 
simple title to the staff portion of Lot 8 subject only to the 
City's unimproved right-of-way access thereon to reach the City's 
uphill water tank (and to Vaughns' contractual obligations to 
Developer). (R. 255-256, 146-155) 
Developer filed a counterclaim and third party complaint 
naming Bountiful City a third party defendant, alleging the 
right-of-way notation on the staff portion of Lot 8 constituted 
the same a public street accessible by the public for any purpose 
and that Vaughns had no right, title or interest therein 
whatsoever. (R. 33-38) 
Bountiful City's Answer to the third party complaint 
admitted Developer's assertion Vaughns owned no interest in the 
staff portion of Lot 8. (R. 343-345) 
Bountiful City then filed a separate quiet title action 
against Vaughns, Developer and the original subdevelopers of 
Indian Springs Subdivision asserting the City was the fee simple 
sole owner of the staff portion of Lot 8 and that no one else had 
any right therein. (See R. 369-375) 
Vaughns moved the trial court to consolidate the later filed 
quiet title action with Vaughns' action pursuant to Rule 42, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 369-370) 
Disposition in Court Below 
After the filing of Affidavits and Memorandums, the trial 
court granted Developer's motion for summary judgment without 
taking testimony, ruling that a valid rescission of the March 9, 
1994 agreement occurred on August 16, 1994 and that Developer's 
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-action in cutting a road up the flag portion of Lot 8 was based 
on Developer's belief, mistaken or otherwise, that Vaughns owned 
no interest in said flag portion. (R. 419-422; 346-350) 
. The trial court did not rule on or address Vaughns' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The court denied Vaughns' motion for consolidation. (R. 
425-426) 
Following the trial courts granting of Developers' motion 
for summary judgment, Developer filed a motion for voluntary 
dismissal of Developer's counterclaim and third-party complaint. 
(R. 351-353) The trial court granted that motion. (R. 426-427) 
The trial court entered an order dismissing Vaughns' 
amended complaint with prejudice and dismissed Plaintiffs claims 
against the John Doe Defendants, but stated in its ruling an 
order that Plaintiffs were not precluded from filing non-contract 
claims against Developer in a separate action. (R. 426) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vaughns own Lot 8, Indian Springs Estates Plat A, a 
subdivision of Bountiful City. (R. 207) Lot 8 is a fairly steep 
foot hill "flag" lot, the staff portion of which extends to and 
abuts Bountiful Boulevard, a city street. (R. 207) An 
unimproved dirt road from Bountiful Boulevard traverses the staff 
portion of Lot 8 and beyond to a City owned water tank higher in 
the foothills. (R. 208) Road usage was controlled by a gate. 
(R. 208) 
In 1978 when the plat including Lot 8 was presented to the 
Bountiful Planning Commission, approval was granted, "subject to 
Lot 8 being a flag lot, in order to maintain a future unimproved 
access or right-of-way into the mountain area." (R. 159-164) 
The Indian Springs Estates Plat A subdivision plat bears the 
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notation "54T road right-of-way" on the staff portion of Lot 8. 
(R. 72) 
Vaughns were advised by Bountiful Cityfs Engineering 
Department that Lot 8 was a fully improved buildable flag lot 
with utilities having been stubbed into the lower staff portion 
thereof abutting Bountiful Boulevard and that to build on the 
flag lot Vaughns would be required to install a driveway up the 
right-of-way, that the City would not install any improvements 
for Vaughns and that Vaughns could lock the gate across the 
right-of-way, giving the Water Department of Bountiful City a key 
for access to the City owned uphill water tank. (R. 208) 
In the fall of 1993 Vaughns had house plans prepared and 
obtained a long term financing commitment for constructing a 
residence on Lot 8. (R. 208) In the course of discussions with 
Bountiful City's Engineering Department, the Department advised 
Vaughns a developer, Defendants and Appellees, Kent A. Hoggan and 
Maple Oaks, L.C., "Developer", was planning to develop property 
East of Lot 8 into a residential subdivision and in connection 
therewith would want to make the staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8 
a street to the Developers subdivision. (R. 209-210) 
Developer determined that rather than litigate the legal 
status of the staff portion of Lot 8, if Vaughns would dedicate 
that portion of Lot 8 as a street for public use by signing 
Developer's plat Developer would install street and other off-
site improvements including utility stubs and slope retention 
devices specifically benefiting and making the balance of Lot 8 a 
usable building lot conforming to City requirements for steep 
lots, with driveway access into the intended street. (R. 210-211) 
Developer promised to install the street and other 
improvements by July 1, 1994. (R. 211, 282) 
An agreement so providing was signed by Vaughns and 
Developer on March 9, 1994. (R. 225-231) 
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Vaughns altered their lot plan to depict a driveway from the 
residence they intended to construct on Lot 8 to access the 
improved street Developer agreed to build and complete through 
the staff portion of Lot 8. (R. 211) 
Vaughns requested a building permit from Bountiful City. 
(R. 208, 216-218, 220) The City refused to issue Vaughns a 
building permit until an off-site improvement completion bond 
should be posted by the Developer guaranteeing completion of the 
off-site improvements including roads, streets, curb and gutter 
the Developer intended to install to benefit Developer's intended 
subdivision. (R. 211-212, 282) 
The Developer did not post an off-site improvement bond, nor 
commence installing improvements as required by the parties March 
9, 1994 agreement. (R. 212, 282) 
Vaughns continued to seek a building permit from the City 
without success. (R. 212, 282) 
On July 26, 1994, Vaughns received a letter from Bountiful 
City stating a building permit could be issued to Vaughns either 
on a basis consistent with a new street being installed on the 
staff portion of Lot 8 or on the basis of Lot 8's flag lot 
frontage on Bountiful Boulevard, the latter option being 
contingent upon Vaughns submitting a statement to the City 
Vaughns were no longer cooperating with the Developer and would 
not dedicate any portion of Vaughns' Lot 8 under the Developers' 
subdivision. (R. 282, 223-224) 
Developer advised Vaughns that Developer's off-site 
improvement bond would be posted by August 15, 1994, but failed 
to do so. (R. 283) 
On August 16, 1994 Vaughns sent a letter to Developer 
returning the sum of $5,000.00 which had been paid by Developer 
to Vaughns pursuant to the March 9, 1994 agreement, and stated 
the agreement was rescinded for breach on the Developers part and 
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advised Developer Vaughns would proceed with flag lot 
development. (R. 83-84, 283) 
Developer responded by asserting the contract could not be 
rescinded, that the Developer would be damaged in the 
neighborhood of $500,000,00 if Vaughns did not honor their side 
of the agreement and Defendants again promised an off-site bond 
would be posted by August 31, 1994 so that Vaughns could obtain a 
residential construction permit. (R. 284, 297-300) 
Vaughns agreed the contract should go forward and the 
parties met in August and September endeavoring to work out 
matters pertaining to Developer's delayed performance. (R. 284, 
293-296, 301-303) 
By letter dated August 22, 1994, Vaughns' counsel requested 
a return of Vaughns refund check which had been sent to 
Defendants on August 16, 1994 which Developers had kept but had 
not cashed. (R. 284, 295) Developer did not return the check, 
but did not cash it. (R. 239, 285) 
On the assumption the contract would be performed by 
Developer, as promised, Vaughns expended time and legal expense 
in endeavoring to negotiate matters of Developer's performance of 
the agreement to a conclusion, and did not alter their building 
plans nor make application for a flag lot building permit. (R. 
28 6) 
Vaughns did not agree that Developer could commence cutting 
a road or otherwise using or occupying the flag portion of Lot 8 
without posting an off-site improvement bond with the City so the 
City would issue Vaughns a building permit. (R. 286) 
By mid-September 1994 it was too late for Vaughns to apply 
for a flag lot development permit and proceed with construction 
in 1994. (R. 286) 
In early September, Developer, who still had not posted an 
off-site improvement bond, refused to engage in any further 
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discussion with Vaughns, (R. 286) but had not cashed Vaughns' 
$5,000.00 check and had not proceeded to cut a road or install 
other improvements in the staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8. (R. 
213) 
Developer maintained Vaughns had no grounds for rescission, 
had breached the contract and could not rescind the contract (R. 
284, 297-300) until September 16, 1994, the day Vaughns filed 
Vaughns' initial complaint in this matter. 
On September 16, 1994, Developers took the position Vaughns 
had no title to the staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8 so that 
contract rescission was appropriate on that basis. (R. 308-309) 
On September 22, 1994 Developer cashed Vaughns' $5,000.00 
check and cut a road up the flag portion of Lot 8, precluding 
Vaughns from flag lot development and possibly precluding all 
development of the balance of Lot 8. (R. 95-96, 213) 
On the assumption Developer would be posting an off-site 
improvement bond so Vaughns could get a building permit, by 
letter dated September 30, 1994, Vaughns tendered a deed to the 
staff portion of Lot 8 directly to Bountiful City, with notice to 
Developer, so it would be available for recording and advised the 
City, and Developer, Vaughns wished to do everything possible to 
expedite Developer's performance of the contract. (R. 247-250, 
286) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Developers rejection of Vaughns' rescission effort, 
insistence on contract performance, and Vaughns consent thereto, 
including Vaughns' request for return of Vaughns' refund check, 
prevented mutually agreed recission from occurring and estopped 
Developer from later purporting to accept rescission. 
Vaughns trial court opposition to Developer's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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and supporting affidavits and the documents submitted therewith 
presented to the trial court underlying facts showing no mutually 
agreed rescission occurred, rather the contrary. Developer 
insisted on proceeding, elected to proceed, and Vaughns relied on 
Developer's promises of contract performance and bypassed all 
opportunity to develop Lot 8 as a flag lot with a private drive. 
The legal principles of estoppel and waiver should have been 
applied by the trial court. 
Vaughns pleadings clearly presented the issue of the legal 
effect of Developer's rejection of Vaughns' rescission effort, 
Developer's insistence on contract performance and Vaughns' 
consent thereto. The facts were undisputed, and presented not 
just genuine issues of material fact but facts upon which the 
trial court should have ruled and upon which this court should 
rule no mutually agreed rescission occurred as a matter of law. 
2. Developer's action including entering into a contract 
under which Developer acknowledged Vaughns' legal title to the 
staff portion of Lot 8 and Vaughns action in reliance thereon 
estopped Developer from later denying Vaughns' legal title as a 
purported basis for rescission. 
Vaughns presented undisputed facts as to the conduct of 
Developer before the Bountiful City Council and in entering into 
the contract with Vaughns, Vaughns reliance thereon and injury 
arising from Developers repudiation of Developers contract. 
Vaughns are entitled to a ruling of this court that 
Developers were thereby estopped from denying Vaughns' legal 
title and waived Developer's right to deny Vaughns legal title as 
a claimed basis for rescission as a matter of law. 
3. It was not disputed that Developer took possession and 
cut a road through the staff right-of-way portion of Vaughns' lot 
on September 22, 1994. 
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Such constituted the taking of the very benefit Developer 
was to receive under the contract, to wit: the right to make the 
staff right-of-way portion of Vaughns' lot a dedicated publicly 
traveled road. 
Developer's action in taking possession of and cutting a 
road through the staff portion of Lot 8, after months of 
promising performance constituted obtaining the benefit of the 
contract and precluded Developer from rescinding the contract 
since contract rescission requires both prompt action and 
restoration of contract benefits received by the rescinding 
party. 
Developer was as aware as Vaughns of the basic facts and 
legal issues before contracting and there was no mutual mistake 
of fact at all upon which rescission could be legally justified. 
Vaughns are therefore entitled to a judgment of this court that 
contract rescission is not a remedy available to Developer. 
4. Vaughns were entitled to a ruling on Vaughns' motion 
for partial summary judgment presenting the issue of whether 
Developers were estopped from claiming rescission and the issue 
of Vaughns legal title to the staff portion of Lot 8. •• 
Rules 54 and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plainly 
entitle litigants to rulings or a trial on all claims made and 
the trial court should not have dismissed the case without ruling 
on the claims made by Vaughns amended complaint and those 
presented by Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The 
trial courts dismissal of the action without ruling on such 
claims was inappropriate, notwithstanding the court purported to 
allow Vaughns to later assert such claims in another action. 
There is no basis in the Rules of Civil Procedure for dismissing 
or refusing to consider filed, presented claims by stating they 
can be asserted in some other proceeding at some other time. The 
court should have considered all the claims made as to the 
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contract rescission issues together and in logical order rather 
than making a ruling likely to be affected by other later 
rulings. 
•5. Bountiful City's subsequently filed quiet title action 
should have been consolidated with this case. 
The later filed quiet title action involved the same parties 
and the same issue as this case —legal interests in the staff 
right-of-way portion of Lot 8. That later filed case should 
therefore have been consolidated with this case under a proper 
application of Rule 42, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to save 
unnecessary litigation costs and delay. The trial court could 
have ordered a separate later trial on the legal title issues if 
any issues remained after ruling on all contract issues. It was 
therefore an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny 
Vaughns' Motion for an Order of Consolidation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEVELOPERS REJECTION OF VAUGHNS' RECISSION EFFORT, INSISTENCE ON 
VAUGHNS' CONTRACT PERFORMANCE AND VAUGHNS' CONSENT THERETO, 
INCLUDING VAUGHNS REQUEST FOR RETURN OF VAUGHNS' REFUND CHECK 
PREVENTED MUTUALLY AGREED RESCISSION FROM OCCURRING AND ESTOPPED 
DEVELOPER FROM LATER PURPORTING TO ACCEPT RESCISSION. 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., provides that summary judgment can be 
rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The party against whom a summary judgment is sought is 
entitled to have all the facts presented and all the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable to 
him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
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It is not necessary for the party opposing summary judgment 
to prove its legal theory. It is only necessary to show a 
genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Salt Lake City Corp v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . 
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact the 
motion should be denied. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon 
Co., 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The parties dealings after August 16, 1994 as shown by 
Affidavits of Robert L. Vaughn and correspondence clearly show 
Developer rejected Vaughns rescission effort and conduct by 
Developer estopping Developer from belatedly purporting to accept 
rescission and that Developer waived the right to accept Vaughns' 
rescission, elected to proceed with contract performance and that 
the Vaughns relied on Developer's promises of performance, 
consenting thereto. 
In any event, the Vaughn Affidavits and correspondence 
certainly raised genuine issues of material fact respecting such 
issues precluding the granting of summary judgment to Developers. 
The following facts as to the dealings of the parties before 
and after Vaughns August 16, 1994 rescission letter were not 
disputed by Developer: 
Under Developer's March 9, 1994 contract with Vaughns, 
Developers agreed to install "off-site" improvements upon the 
staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8 by July 1, 1994, and to exercise 
reasonable good faith efforts to encourage Bountiful City to 
issue Vaughns a building permit. (R. 227) 
Developer did not post an off-site improvement bond with 
Bountiful City with the result the City would not issue Vaughns a 
building permit. (R. 282) 
On July 2 6, 1994, Robert Vaughn and his attorney met with 
the Bountiful City Attorney concerning obtaining a building 
permit and Bountiful City gave Vaughns a letter stating the 
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City's position that a building permit could be issued Vaughns on 
a basis consistent with a new street being constructed or on the 
basis of flag lot frontage on Bountiful Boulevard, the later 
option being contingent on Vaughns submitting a statement to the 
City Vaughns are no longer cooperating with Developer and would 
not dedicate any portion of Vaughns' lot under Developer's 
subdivision (R. 283, 223-224) 
Based on that advice, at Vaughns' request, Vaughns' attorney 
wrote letters to Defendants on July 28, 1994 and August 10, 1994 
advising Defendants Vaughns were incurring damages by reason of 
the delay and demanding performance, else Vaughns would rescind 
the contract and proceed to develop Lot 8 as a flag lot. (R. 
283, 288-290, 291-292) 
Developer thereupon promised Vaughns Developer would post 
the bond by August 15, 1994. (R. 283) 
The July 28, 1994 letter included the following advice to 
Developer: 
Since it is unclear at this point whether you will be 
able to perform as required above by August 15, 1994, 
and Vaughns use of their lot as a flag lot with access 
to Bountiful Blvd. may require a differing scheme of 
access from that contemplated if a street is provided 
by you, do not run expenses or commence construction on 
Vaughns' lot until after the conditions of this letter 
are met, [emphasis added] (R. 290) 
The July 28, 1994 letter further advised Developer that if 
Developer was unable to perform by August 15, 1994 Vaughns would 
rescind the March 9, 1994 contract, so advise the City and ask 
Associated Title to return a deposited deed to the right-of-way 
portion of Plaintiffs lot. (R. 290) 
Developers did not post a bond by August 15, 1994, as 
promised. (R. 283) 
Vaughns then requested their attorney to send a letter to 
Defendants dated August 16, 1994 which advised Developer the 
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contract was rescinded for Developer's nonperformance, returned 
the $5,000.00 paid by Developer under the contract and advised 
Developer that Vaughns would proceed with flag-lot development 
and by copy of said letter Associated Title Company was requested 
to return the deed to the staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8. (R. 
83-84, 283) 
On August 21, 1994, Vaughns placed a "No Trespassing" sign 
on the staff portion of Lot 8 and that evening John Clark, 
representing Developer, came to Vaughns' residence, stated the 
contract could not be rescinded and that his lawyer had said so 
and threatened to file legal action and, after considerable 
discussion, advised Affiant that Defendants would get all things 
completed in 10 days - by August 31, 1994. (R. 283-284) That 
statement led Vaughns to believe and they did believe Developer 
would file an off-site improvement bond by then so Vaughns could 
obtain a residential construction permit. (R. 284) 
Vaughns then requested their attorney to write a further 
letter to Developer on August 22, 1994, which extended the time 
for Developer to perform the Agreement (by posting a bond) to 
August 31, 1994, so Vaughns could get a building permit. That 
letter stated the issue of damages would be reserved for 
determination by an independent mediator, if Developer would so 
agree, and requested a return of Vaughns' check in the sum of 
$5,000.00 sent to Developer on August 16, 1994. (R. 284, 293-
295) By copy of said letter Associated Title was requested to 
continue to assist Developer to conclude the mechanics of 
document assembly and signing for the purpose of getting a bond 
to the City and a building permit for Vaughns. (R. 295) 
On August 26, 1994, Vaughns' attorney received a letter from 
Developer's attorney which asserted Developer would be damaged 
"in the neighborhood of $500, 000.00" if "Vaughns do not honor 
their side of the Agreement" and which asserted Vaughns had 
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failed to convey the property required to be dedicated for the 
street and which promised performance by Developer "within a few 
days". (R. 284, 297-298) 
Thereafter on or about August 29, 1994, Vaughns were orally 
advised by John Clark, representing Developer, that Developer was 
ready to proceed and go forward with their development and the 
posting of a bond and the same day Vaughns' attorney received a 
second letter from Developer's Attorney promising Developer would 
post a bond by Wednesday, August 31, 1994 as promised by John 
Clark on August 21, 1994. (R. 284, 299-300) 
Vaughns' attorney responded to Developer's August 29, 1994 
letter by letter dated August 30, 1994, advising Developer of the 
City's position which continued to be that all that was necessary 
for Vaughns to get a building permit was for Developer to post an 
off-site improvement bond (to guarantee completion of the off-
site improvements in Developer's subdivision and on the staff 
portion of Vaughns' Lot 8.) By copy of that letter Vaughns urged 
Associated Title Company to conclude the mechanics of document 
assembly and signing for the purpose of satisfying City 
requirements and getting the City to issue Vaughns a building 
permit. (R. 284, 302-303) 
No bond was posted by August 31, 1994 and on that day Robert 
Vaughn, his attorney, Developer Kent Hoggan, John Clark 
(representing Developer) and Developer's attorney met to work 
matters out. (R. 284-285) Vaughns' attorney prepared a written 
settlement draft and furnished it to Developer's attorney. (R. 
285) 
On September 2, 1994, Developer's attorney wrote two 
additional letters to Vaughns' attorney about resolving the 
matter, reaffirming Developer's preparedness to proceed with 
performance, asserting Vaughns were in breach of the Agreement, 
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stating Vaughns claims were unjustified and enclosing a written 
contract settlement proposal. (R. 285, 304-306) 
On September 7, 1994, Developer's attorney sent another 
letter to Vaughns' attorney rejecting Vaughns' suggested changes 
in Developer's settlement proposal draft and stating: "We have 
suggested the alternative of the parties proceeding with 
performance, with the alleged defaults and damages of the parties 
(both sides) being mediated (see my letter of September 2, 
1994)". (R. 285, 307) 
Vaughns' attorney respond to said letter on behalf of 
Vaughns , by letter dated September 8, 1994, outlining the 
history of the parties dealings in a further effort to work 
matters out. (R. 285, 233-246) 
That letter included the following: 
The unexplained delay at that point suggested your 
client could well fail to post the bond by August 15, 
so it appeared Vaughns building alternative would to be 
to rescind the Agreement for non-performance on your 
clients part and to proceed with "flag lot" 
development. (emphasis added) (R. 238) 
Therefore your client was told not to incur expenses as 
to Vaughns' lot until after Vaughns received the 
assurances as to performances and liquidated damage sum 
stated in the letter. (R. 238) 
On August 16, 1994 at the request of Robert Vaughn I 
wrote a letter to Bountiful City and another letter to 
your clients advising that because of lack of promised 
performance on the part of your clients by the close of 
business August 15, the March 9 Agreement was rescinded 
by the Vaughns and I returned your clients money paid 
the Vaughns pursuant to that Agreement. That letter 
further advised your clients the Vaughns would proceed 
with flag lot development, (emphasis added) (R. 239) 
Your clients have kept the check sent back with my 
letter. I understand they have not cashed it. (R. 
239) 
Upon Developer's oral and written rejection of Vaughns' 
August 16, 1994 rescission letter and Developers repeated 
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assurances they intended to perform, communicated to Vaughns 
orally and in writing Vaughns relied thereon in expending 
substantial personal time and incurring legal expense in 
endeavoring to negotiate matters of performance of the Agreement 
to a conclusion, and on the assumption the contract would be 
performed Vaughns did not alter their building plans or make 
application for a flag lot building permit. (R. 286) 
At no time did Vaughns agree or consent that if the contract 
was rescinded Developer could nonetheless cut a road through the 
staff portion of Vaughns' Lot 8. (R. 286) 
At no time during the course of the discussions Vaughns had 
with Developer after August 16, 1994 did Developer, or any person 
acting on behalf of Developer, ask for nor did Vaughns offer any 
change in the terms of rescission, which Developer had not 
accepted in any event, but had expressly rejected as set forth 
above. (R. 286) 
Vaughns' rescission terms included return of the parties to 
their pre-contract position so Vaughns could proceed, and Vaughns 
intended to proceed, with development of their Lot 8 as a flag 
lot with no public street, only a private driveway access to 
Bountiful Boulevard. (R. 286, 83-84) 
By mid-September, 1994 it was too late in the season for 
Vaughns to apply for a flag lot development permit and proceed 
with construction in 1994. (R. 286) 
After sending their September 7, 1994 letter, Developer 
refused to engage in further contract settlement discussions so 
Vaughns requested their attorney to file a complaint seeking a 
judicial resolution of the matter. (R. 286) Vaughns' Complaint 
was filed on September 16, 1994. (R. 1) 
The same day, upon learning of the suit, Developer's 
attorney sent a letter to Vaughns' attorney stating Developers 
accepted rescission but disagreeing with the basis for rescission 
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set forth in Vaughns' August 16, 1994 letter. Developers letter 
asserted that Developers believed Developer had not breached the 
contract and stated Vaughns had not title to the road right-of-
way nor even a colorable claim of title so that rescission was 
appropriate "based on a mutual mistake of fact and/or failure of 
consideration." (R. 286, 308-309) 
A. There was no mutually agreed rescission. 
For mutual rescission to occur, both contracting parties 
must consent to the terms of the rescission. There must be an 
offer and an acceptance of the offer, e.g., a mutual meeting of 
minds. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min., Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 
(Utah 1987) and Bazurto v. Burgess, 666 P.2d 497 (Az. App. 1983). 
As set forth above, Developer rejected Vaughns rescission on 
the terms offered - that the parties would be returned to their 
pre-contract position with Vaughns proceeding with flag lot 
building plans in 1994 for a private secluded residence not on a 
street. Developer vigorously resisted rescission, asserted 
Vaughns had no basis for rescission and could not rescind and 
promised performance. 
Vaughns relied on that promise in the expectation 
performance as promised would occur and took no steps to proceed 
with flag lot development. 
Clearly there was no factual basis for finding mutually 
agreed rescission on Developer's Motion for Summary Judgment — 
only a factual basis for finding there as no mutually agreed 
rescission, or, at the very least, a question of fact was 
preserved for trial. 
B. Developer was equitably estopped by Developer' s conduct 
after August 16, 1994 from purporting to accept rescission or 
rescinding the contract. 
Equitable estoppel is conduct by one party which leads 
another party in reliance thereon to adopt a course of action 
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resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted 
to repudiate that parties conduct. Perkins v. Great-West Life 
Assur. Co., 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). 
As set forth above, immediately upon receipt of Vaughns 
letter dated August 16, 1994, Developer, acting through by John 
Clark, asserted Vaughns had no right to rescind, and could not 
rescind, asserted that Developer would be damaged if Vaughns did 
not perform the Agreement and promised to post a bond and 
otherwise perform so that Vaughns could proceed with getting a 
building permit on the basis of constructing a house fronting on 
the street Developer proposed to build. 
Vaughns thereupon relied on Developers promises of 
performance, extended the time for performance, refrained from 
seeking a building permit on a flag lot development basis and 
expended substantial personal time and incurred legal expense in 
endeavoring to work matters out after Developer failed to post a 
bond by the times promised. 
Vaughns bypassed all opportunity to commence flag lot 
development late in the summer of 1994 in reliance on Developers' 
promises. Vaughns gave up substantial legal rights and incurred 
substantial legal expense by reason of Developers' conduct in 
promising contract performance inducing Vaughns to go along with 
further delay in bond posting. 
Developer thereby became equitably estopped from changing 
Developers' position and belatedly purporting to accept 
rescission in mid-September 1994 by Developers' months conduct 
asserting Vaughns could not rescind and agreeing to perform by 
which Developer obtained Vaughns consent to contract performance. 
See Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977) and 
Perkins, supra. 
C. Developer waived Developer' s right to accept contract 
rescission. 
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Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 
Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc., 831 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 
1992) and State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 1992). 
Developer had the right to accept Vaughns rescission after 
August 16, 1994, on the stated terms thereof and had Developer 
promptly done so, Vaughns would have proceeded to amend their lot 
development plan to apply for a flag lot building permit and 
commenced building in late summer 1994. 
As set forth above, Developer did not exercise Developer's 
right to accept rescission, but on the contrary, on August 21, 
1994, Developer threatened Vaughns with legal action if Vaughns 
proceeded with rescission, and promised that Developer would get 
all things completed in 10 days* Vaughns accepted that promise 
by letter dated August 22, 1994. 
Further, Developer wrote letters dated August 26, 1994, 
August 29, 1994 and September 2, 1994, denying Vaughns had any 
legal rescission right, threatening litigation if Vaughns 
proceeded with rescission and making continued promises Developer 
would perform the contract, which promises Vaughns accepted and 
relied on and pursuant to which Vaughns refrained from seeking a 
building permit on the basis of flag lot development and spent 
considerable personal effort and incurred legal expense towards 
contract performance based on Developer's promises. 
Developer's conduct amounted to a waiver of a known right as 
a matter of law, especially when the waiver of the right to 
accept rescission and election, indeed demand, of going forward 
was made with the advice and assistance of Developer's legal 
counsel. 
D. Developer elected to go forward with performance of the 
contract. 
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It is elementary contract law that a party does not have the 
right to proceed both with contract rejection and contract 
acceptance at the same time. 
By electing and demanding to proceed with performance, with 
which election Vaughns agreed, Developer made a binding election 
which Developer had no legal right to abandon to the detriment of 
Vaughns. 
Developer conduct in electing to proceed with the contract 
and in fact threatening Vaughns with a lawsuit for substantial 
damages if Vaughns would not go forward constituted the clearest 
kind of an election to affirm and go forward with the contract. 
E. Plaintiffs relied upon Developer election to go forward 
with the contract. 
As set forth above, Vaughns reasonably relied on Developer's 
promises to go forward with the contract by not demanding a 
building permit be issued for flag lot development by putting in 
time and incurring legal expense in endeavoring to negotiate 
matters of contract performance to a final conclusion and in said 
process lost the 1994 construction season. 
Said reliance was very reasonable under the circumstances 
and precluded Developer from belatedly taking a contrary position 
purporting to accept rescission to the detriment of Vaughns. 
Mutually agreed rescission did not occur. Developers 
rejection of Vaughns' rescission letter and insistence on 
contract performance and Vaughns agreement thereto and 
foreseeable conduct in reliance thereon estopped Developer from 
belatedly changing positions as a matter of law. Developer 
waived Developer's right to accept contract rescission, elected 
to perform the contract, and Vaughns relied upon that election. 
The legal effect of documents and the conduct of the parties 
with respect to their duties under those documents is subject to 
appellate review in any event under a correctness standard. See 
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Hermes Associates v. Parks Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah App. 
1991) and Progressive Acquisition Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 
(Utah App. 1991). 
Therefore, to avoid a second appeal, Vaughns request this 
court to set forth the rescission rejection/estoppel/waiver and 
election legal effect of the conduct of Developer referred to in 
the documents in the record and above. 
POINT II 
DEVELOPER'S ACTIONS INCLUDING ENTERING INTO THE CONTRACT UNDER 
WHICH DEVELOPER SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED VAUGHNS' LEGAL TITLE TO 
THE STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8 AND VAUGHNS' ACTION IN RELIANCE 
THEREON ESTOPPED DEVELOPER FROM LATER DENYING VAUGHNS' LEGAL 
TITLE AS A PURPORTED BASIS FOR CONTRACT RESCISSION. 
A. Developer's actions estopped Developer from denying 
Vaughns legal title. 
All of the elements of estoppel are present in the instant 
case vis: (a) admissions, statements and acts of Developer 
inconsistent with Developers later claim Vaughns have no rights 
to the staff portion of Lot 8/ (b) action by Vaughns on the faith 
of such admissions, statements and acts; (c) injury to Vaughns 
resulting from allowing Developer to contradict and repudiate 
Developer's admissions, statements and acts. These estoppel 
elements are summarized in van der Heyde v. First Colony Life 
Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1993); Mendez v. State 
Department of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1991); 
and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 
1990) . See also Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 814 P.2d 
1125 (Utah App. 1991). 
Developer had apparently been working on Developer's 
Viewpoint/Highland Oaks Subdivision for several months and 
possibly for over two years before the March 9, 1994 contract was 
signed. See January 4, 1994 Bountiful Planning Commission 
Minutes made Exhibit "C" to the Arden F. Jenson Affidavit of 
26 
Certification. (R. 166) These minutes note both Kent Hoggan and 
John Clark were present and that their property had been granted 
preliminary subdivision approval by the City Council over two 
years before - on December 23, 1992. These minutes include an 
access road condition or comment (number 7 on page 2) that: 
"This development has two access points: from Bountiful Blvd. at 
approximately 3750 So., between lots 7 and 9 of Indian Springs 
Estates Plat A on the right-of-way dedicated as part of lot 
8 " (R. 166) 
Developer was obviously well aware of the "Road Right-Of-
Way" and "0.43 Ac" notations on the staff portion of Lot 8 prior 
to contracting. 
In the March 1, 1994 Bountiful Planning Commission Minutes 
the attendance of Kent Hoggan and John Clark was noted. See 
March 1, 1994 Bountiful Planning Commission Minutes made Exhibit 
>ND" to the Arden F. Jenson Affidavit of Certification. (R. 169) 
A condition of approval of Developer' subdivision was: u7. 
Completion of all site improvements to Bountiful Boulevard and 
dedication of the right-of-way as required;". [emphasis added] 
On the top of the second page of said minutes (R. 170) the 
following appears: 
Regarding #7, adjacent property owner Robert Vaughn 
said according to the minutes of January 19, 1994, the 
right-of-way has already been dedicated. Mr. Balling 
replied that legally it may not be classified as 
• dedicated, but it is recorded as a road right-of-way. 
Mr. Hoggan said their position has been that whether it 
is dedicated or not, they would like to work with Mr. 
Vaughn because he plans to do something on lot 8 of 
Indian Springs. They will put the improvements in and 
make sure the road is dedicated the way it should be 
whether for Mr. Vaughns' lot or the development. They 
understand that the title report will have to include 
that section, and it cannot be recorded until this is 
done. (R. 170) 
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An admission and statement more inconsistent with 
Developer's later assertion that Vaughns had nothing to sell 
could hardly be expressed. Developers were fully aware of the 
notations on the plat on the staff of Lot 8 and chose to work 
with Vaughns rather than asserting the right-of-way area was 
already a dedicated public street in which Vaughns had no rights. 
Developer signed a contract with Vaughns on March 9, 1994. 
(R. 211, 225-231) The signed contract specifically recites on 
pages 1 and 2 as follows: 
WHEREAS, Vaughns own Lot 8, Indian Spring Estates Plat 
"A" Bountiful, Davis County, Utah which is a flag lot 
abutting Bountiful Boulevard, and 
WHEREAS, Hoggan intends to develop a subdivision known 
as HIGHLAND ESTATES in the foothill area of Bountiful 
near said flag Lot, and 
WHEREAS, Hoggan desires that the "flag" portion of 
Vaughns said Lot 8, consisting of a strip 54 feet more 
or less in width shown on the Plat of Indian Springs 
Estate Plat "A" as a right-of-way, become an improved 
dedicated street meeting the requirements of Bountiful 
City as a means of access to Hoggan's proposed Highland 
Estates subdivision, and 
WHEREAS, Vaughns have submitted an application to the 
City of Bountiful for a building permit for the 
construction by Vaughns of a residence and related 
improvements on said Lot 8, which building permit has 
not yet been issued, and 
WHEREAS, the elevation of Vaughns prospective house on 
said Lot 8 and the elevation and contour of the 
proposed driveway which will access the same has been 
depicted on certain survey plats prepared by surveyor 
James G. West and Vaughns require the elevation of the 
proposed public street over and across the flag portion 
of said Lot 8 to be such as will accommodate the 
proposed driveway within Bountiful City maximum slope 
requirements, and 
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that Vaughns will sign 
Hoggan's Highland Estates Subdivision Plat which is 
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proposed to be recorded so that the flag portion of Lot 
8 will become a dedicated street providing Hoggan 
provides the consideration hereinbelow set forth to 
Vaughns, and the parties desire to set forth their 
Agreement concerning the conditions upon which the 
Vaughns will sign said Plat, [emphasis added] (The 
"flag" reference should read "staff".) (R. 225-226) 
• • • 
The signed contract with its express recital that Vaughns' 
own the portion of Lot 8 shown as a road right-of-way constitutes 
the clearest and most unequivocal kind of an act satisfying the 
first element of estoppel. 
The second element, action by Vaughns on the faith of 
Developer's admissions, statements and acts, is clearly 
satisfied. Under the contract Vaughns gave up their option of 
developing their lot as a secluded flag lot with private access 
to Bountiful Boulevard. Vaughns altered their site plan to show 
access to the intended road. (R. 211) Vaughns obtained a 
construction loan incurring substantial cost in connection 
therewith. (R. 208) Vaughns expended substantial time and 
incurred legal expense in endeavoring to get Developer to post a 
bond and to perform per the contract so the City would issue 
Vaughns a building permit. (R. 211-213) 
The third element of estoppel is clearly satisfied. 
Allowing Developer to contradict and repudiate Developer's 
admissions, statements and contract act will not only take from 
Vaughns the option of secluded flag lot development but also 
deprive Vaughns of the benefit of the contract (proper street 
elevation, utility stubs and slope retaining wall) and possibly 
destroy all value of the remainder of Lot 8 as a building lot, or 
at the very least, make it very expensive to utilize the same. 
(R. 213) 
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In Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977) 
documents for the sale of real property reflected one-third 
ownership each in certain related selling family members. The 
documents were signed, the sellers thereby binding themselves to 
sell and giving up legal rights to make claims as to different 
ownership shares contrary to the sales documents. Three weeks 
later one of the sellers opposed the one-third each contract 
division of sale proceeds and asserted a claim to half. The 
court held such person was equitably estopped to make such claim, 
having contractually agreed to the division of sales proceeds in 
thirds, other parties having relied thereon to their detriment if 
the objecting party was permitted to repudiate her conduct. 
To the same effect is Kephart v. Portmann, 855 P.2d 120 
(Mont. 1993) in which an irrigation ditch agreement had been 
signed in which Kephart acknowledged and recognized the existence 
of Portmann's ditch right to conduct water to Portmann's 
property. Portmann had used and improved the ditch. Kephart 
later sued, contending Portmann really had no ditch rights and 
sought to enjoin Portmann from interfering with the ditch and its 
diversion structures. The court held that Kephart's 
acknowledgment in the irrigation ditch agreement of the 
Portmann's ditch right, estopped Kephart from later challenging 
the existence of the Portmann's ditch right. Having concluded 
Kephart was estopped from denying Portmann's ditch right, the 
court held it did not need to otherwise determine the right. 
As a matter of law, under the undisputed evidence, mostly in 
documents, Developer is estopped from repudiating Developer's 
admissions, statements and written contract, all of which 
specifically recognize Vaughns' property rights• 
B. Developer waived any claim Vaughns lacked title to the 
staff part of Lot 8. 
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Under the same undisputed facts Developer waived the right 
to claim Vaughns have no rights in the staff portion of Lot 8. 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co., Inc./ 831 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 
1992) and State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 1992). There 
must be an existing right, knowledge of its existence and an 
intent to relinquish it which can be implied from conduct. One 
cannot prevent a waiver by a private mental reservation contrary 
to actions clearly indicating relinquishment intent. Beckstead, 
supra. 831 P.2d 130, 133. 
Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners, Ass'n., 656 P.2d 414 (Utah 
1982) recognizes that a party may "waive" its rights in respect 
to land use and be therefore "estopped" from endeavoring to 
thereafter enforce such rights to exclude another's use or rights 
with respect to that property. 
Developer first waived any right Developer had to assert 
Vaughns had no rights in the staff road right-of-way part of Lot 
8 in the Bountiful City Planning Commission meeting held March 1, 
1994. (R. 169-170) Those minutes state one of the plat approval 
conditions imposed by Bountiful City was "dedication of the 
right-of-way". (R. 169) Developer Hoggan, in the presence of 
his associate John Clark, then stated before the 11 city 
officials present and Robert L. Vaughn, that "whether it was 
dedicated or not, they would like to work with Mr. Vaughn and 
would put in the improvements and make sure the road is dedicated 
the way it should be whether for Mr. Vaughns' lot, or the 
development". (R. 170) 
Eight days after that meeting the contract was signed with 
its recitals set forth above. (R. 225-226) 
Developer clearly and intentionally waived, relinquished and 
abandoned Developer's right to claim Vaughns to be without rights 
as to the staff portion of Lot 8. 
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Since the essential facts are shown by undisputed 
documentary evidence, this court is requested to rule on the 
legal estoppel/waiver effect of Developers undisputed acts and 
conduct to avoid a second appeal. See Hermes Associates, supra. 
POINT III 
DEVELOPER'S ACTION IN TAKING POSSESSION OF AND CUTTING A ROAD 
THROUGH THE STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8 CONSTITUTED OBTAINING THE 
BENEFIT OF THE CONTRACT AND PRECLUDED DEVELOPER FROM RESCINDING 
THE CONTRACT. 
A. Contract rescission whether "at law" or "in equity" 
requires the restoration of the parties to their pre-contract 
position. 
Rescission "at law" includes the requirement of restoration 
or tender of what was received in the bargain "as a condition of 
getting restitution". "If the defendant does not go along, the 
plaintiff will then have to bring a suit to recover restitution 
for what the plaintiff gave to the defendant in the deal. ... If 
the plaintiff was right in thinking he had grounds to rescind, 
the court will render an ordinary judgment for the plaintiff on 
the theory that because the deal is rescinded, the defendant owes 
the plaintiff restitution by way of replevin or what used to be 
called assumpsit." DOBBS, Law of Remedies, 2nd Edition, Vol. 1, 
§4.8. 
Rescission does not permit a party to reap benefits the 
party would not have reaped if the transaction had not taken 
place. Rescission requires restoration of the parties to their 
pre-contract position. Rescission does not require a party to 
sacrifice the benefits of the agreement and at the same time not 
be restored to the benefits conferred on the other party. Rowley 
v. Marrcrest Homeowners, Assfn., 656 P.2d 414 (Utah 1982); 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah App. 1990); 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984); Bergstrom v. Estate 
of DeVoe, 854 P.2d 860 (Nev. 1993); Cady v. Burton, 851 P.2d 1047 
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(Mont. 1993); and Vacova Co. v. Farrell, 814 P.2d 255 (Wash. App. 
1991). 
In discussing "tender", DOBBS states such is normally 
required "simply because it would be unfair to insist that the 
defendant give up what he got without any assurance of getting 
back what he gave." DOBBS, p. 673, 674. 
A suit to have a court decree a rescission is called 
rescission "in equity" DOBBS, Law of Remedies, 2d Ed.Vol.I §4.8 
p.675. 
DOBBS points out that rescission "in equity" is not 
accomplished until the court so decrees. 
DOBBS states that the cases are divided as to whether the 
party seeking rescission should tender or offer restoration in 
his complaint, or show ability to make restoration, but that it 
is clear that the court is to protect the other party by its 
decree and must condition rescission upon full restoration. 
Developer purported to accept rescission or to effect 
rescission while ignoring entirely the fact rescission required 
Developer to relinquish what Developer got under the contract. 
Developer took possession and used what Developer was to receive 
under the contract. Developer has not tendered it back, in 
effect claiming the right to all benefits under the contract 
while rejecting Developer's contract responsibilities. 
Developers taking the benefit of the contract absolutely 
precludes Developer, as a matter of law, from asserting a right 
to rescind and reject the contract. 
Only if Developer had determined not to use the staff 
portion of Lot 8 as a means of access to Developer's subdivision 
would it have been within Developer's right to accept Vaughns' 
effort to rescind because the parties then would have been 
returned to their pre-contract position. Vaughns would have been 
able to use the staff portion of Lot 8 for a private driveway and 
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would have been relieved of their obligation to make the staff 
portion of Lot 8 a dedicated publicly traveled street. 
It was a breach of Developer's contract duty of good faith 
for Developer to take the staff portion of Lot 8 while in the act 
of cashing Vaughns' check which returned the $5,000.00 Developer 
agreed to pay for the right to turn the staff portion of Lot 8 
into a public road. 
Developer's action in taking possession of and cutting a 
road through the staff portion of Lot 8 and failure to place 
Vaughns in Vaughns pre-contract position, precluded Developer 
from purporting to accept or effect contract rescission as a 
matter of law. The trial courts ruling and order failed to 
address this issue. See ruling and order annexed as Addendums I 
and II which are contained in the record at 346-350 and 425-427. 
B. Developer's failure to act promptly precluded Developer 
from rescinding. 
Even if Developer did have an initial right to rescind (and 
Developer had no such right) Developer's failure to act promptly 
precluded Developer from rescinding. Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah 
2d 399, 438 P.2d 813 (1968) 
Perry v. Woodall held that the buyer of a business was not 
entitled to rescind since the buyer had retained possession of 
the business assets and carried on the business, while expressing 
dissatisfaction with his purchase and offering to renegotiate. 
The court held the buyer, after learning all the facts, if he 
then considered he had been defrauded, had a duty to so notify 
the seller and promptly tender back the purchased property. "The 
law is well settled that one electing to rescind a contract must 
tender back to the other contracting party whatever property of 
value he has received". Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815. 
Perry cited with approval Shappirio v. Goldberg, 24 S.Ct. 259, 
192 U.S. 232, which held "that where a party desires to rescind 
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upon the ground of misrepresentation or fraud, he must, upon the 
discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose and adhere to it. 
If he continues to treat the property as his own the right of 
rescission is gone and he is held bound by the contract." 
No misrepresentation nor fraud is or could be claimed in 
this case. Even when fraud is claimed, the law does not offer 
indemnity against the adverse consequences of folly and indolence 
or protect careless indifference to information which would 
enlighten a contracting party concerning the accuracy or lack 
thereof of a seller's assertions. Every person reposes at his 
own peril in another's opinion if he has ample opportunity to 
exercise informed judgment. Poison Co. v. Imperial Cattle Co., 
624 P.2d 993 (Mont. 1981) . 
A party cannot retain the fruits of a contract, as Developer 
did in this case, while awaiting future developments to determine 
whether it will be more profitable to affirm or to disaffirm. 
Porras v. Bass, 665 P.2d 1249 (Or.App. 1983) and Ristau v. 
Wescold, Inc., 852 P.2d 271 (Or.App. 1993). 
If Developer wanted to assert that Vaughns had no rights in 
the staff portion of Lot 8, rather than contracting with Vaughns, 
Developer should have announced that purpose and adhered to it in 
January or February 1994 by then undertaking proceedings to 
obtain a court determination of the matter. 
Instead, Developer contracted to acquire Vaughns rights 
rather than content them (R. 225-231) and for six months dealt on 
the basis of the contract, repeatedly asserting Vaughns had no 
right to rescind and that Developer would perform. R. 284, 297-
300) 
Developer's failure to act promptly precluded Developer from 
repudiating Developer's contract even if the contract had been 
obtained by misrepresentation, which was not the case. 
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C. There was no factual or legal basis for Developer's 
assertion rescission was appropriate based on a "mutual mistake 
of fact". 
Developer mischaracterized as a "mutual mistake of fact" 
Developer's unilateral legal assertion the staff portion of Lot 8 
is not part of the lot but a dedicated public road so Vaughns had 
nothing to sell. The "mutual mistake of fact" claimed by 
Developer is a "belief that the Vaughns owned the road right-of-
way." (R. 70) 
A case Developer cited to the trial court, Robert Langston, 
LTD. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987), plainly states 
a "mutual mistake" requires that both parties share a 
misconception of vital fact upon which they base their bargain. 
Here there was no factual misconception at all. At most 
there was a difference of opinion as to what legal estates or 
rights or duties on the part of Vaughns and on the part of 
Bountiful City were possibly involved in the staff part of flag 
Lot 8 which, to be a legal lot, as set forth below, had to 
include the staff to abut and it does abut Bountiful Boulevard, a 
dedicated street. The staff has the notation "Road Right-of-Way" 
on it. No street improvements had ever been constructed thereon. 
(R. 208-210, 213) Bountiful City never assumed and would not 
assume any obligation to install street improvements, but 
required either that a private drive be installed, which 
Bountiful City could use, or that the staff road right-of-way 
area be dedicated by Vaughns as a public street with Vaughns' 
development plan altered accordingly with full street 
improvements installed on the staff/right-of-way area. (See R. 
208-210, 220) No "mutual mistake of fact" existed. 
Developer deliberately chose not to contest or litigate 
Vaughns' rights and the nature thereof or the City's rights or 
duties or the nature thereof, but chose instead to contract with 
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Vaughns under which Vaughns agreed to give up all legal rights 
Vaughns held in the staff part of Lot 8 and make it a publicly 
street for which Developer agreed to put in street improvements, 
utility stubs and a rock retention wall in a manner making the 
rest of Lot 8 usable. (R. 225-231) 
It is undisputed that Developer has not restored nor 
tendered restoration of the benefit of its contract- It is 
undisputed Developer failed to act promptly. It is clear there 
was no mutual mistake of fact - only Developer's legal opinion 
that Vaughns own no title to the staff portion of Lot 8. 
A trial courts conclusions of law are accorded no deference, 
but are reviewed for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 748 P. 2d 
1186 (Utah 1989). The legal effect of documents and the party's 
conduct in respect to their contractual duties are reviewed under 
a correctness standard. See Hermes Associates, supra. This 
court is therefore requested to rule as a matter of law Developer 
had no rescission right to avoid a second appeal. 
POINT IV 
VAUGHNS WERE ENTITLED TO A RULING ON VAUGHNS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRESENTING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEVELOPERS WERE 
ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING THE CONTRACT OR CLAIMING RESCISSION AND 
THE ISSUE OF VAUGHNS' LEGAL TITLE TO THE STAFF PORTION OF LOT 8. 
The claims, rights and liabilities of all of the parties to 
an action are to be adjudicated rather than dismissed without the 
entry of appropriate rulings. Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The language of Rule 54(b) and (c) (1) plainly assumes the 
trial courts have a duty to adjudicate all the claims presented 
by the parties. 
Rule 54(c)(1) provides that every final judgment "shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings..." [emphasis added] 
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Rule 54 (b) allows for the entry of a final judgment as to 
fewer than "all of the claims or parties only upon ... (certain 
conditions) .... In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action ... before the entry of judgment adjudicating 
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties." [emphasis added] 
Vaughns do certainly claim the right to appeal from the 
final judgment made to this court and do not assert Rule 54 
applies in this case to prevent finality of the judgment that was 
made. 
Vaughns point is simply that when one subject matter is 
presented by cross motions for summary judgment as in this case, 
it is not appropriate for the trial court to rule on one of the 
arguments made by one party's motion without considering or 
ruling upon, or even addressing, the countervailing evidence and 
arguments made in the other party's motion. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly precludes the 
granting of summary judgment when any of the other party's 
statements and other evidentiary materials present material 
factual issues. Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Furthermore, Rule 1(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides the rules are to be liberally construed to secure the 
just, expedient and inexpensive determination of every action. 
The trial court should not have ruled on Developer's Motion 
for Summary Judgment when a ruling on the issues presented by 
Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would affect the 
correctness of a ruling on Developer's motion. 
38 
Rather than ruling on only one argument of one party based 
on only part of the evidence and dismissing the case, the trial 
court clearly should have ruled on all related issues and 
evidence presented by the cross motions for summary judgment in 
logical order with a view to securing the objective of Rule 1(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
An issue preliminary to the rescission question was whether 
Developer was estopped by conduct before the City Council and by 
entering into the contract from challenging Vaughns' title. If 
the trial court had found contract estoppel existed, Developer 
had no basis for claiming rescission on the ground Vaughns lacked 
title. 
If the trial court had ruled no conduct/contract estoppel 
existed, and the court should not have so ruled without at least 
granting an evidentiary hearing, then the trial court should have 
then ruled on the issue of whether "mutual rescission" could 
occur when Developer vigorously rejected Vaughns rescission 
effort and the parties agreed the contract would go forward. 
If the court determined no contract estoppel existed and 
that no mutually agreed rescission occurred, the court should 
then have proceeded to determine whether Vaughns had fee simple, 
or other title, to the staff portion of Lot 8. If the court so 
found, Developer would then have had no right to assert 
rescission on the grounds Vaughns lacked title. 
The trial court should also have addressed the issue of 
whether Developer could rescind while at the same time taking 
action precluding restoration of Vaughns to Vaughns' pre-contract 
position. 
The objective of Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
would also have been served had the court deferred ruling on 
Developer's contract rescission motion to address all contract 
issues simultaneously. Had the court done so, rather than not 
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ruling on a number of issues presented and dismissing Vaughns' 
complaint, the trial outcome may have been substantially 
different and an appeal proceeding may have been avoided. 
The effect of proceeding to determine all issues in an 
orderly manner would have been to save all parties considerable 
expense and burden. 
As a minimum, under a fair application of the rules, Vaughns 
were entitled to a ruling on Vaughns' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment which presented the issues of estoppel, waiver, failure 
to act promptly and other issues arising out of Developer's 
conduct and also the issue of whether Vaughns owned fee simple 
title to the staff portion of Lot 8 subject only to a right-of-
way for unimproved access to the mountains in favor of Bountiful 
City. 
POINT V 
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S SUBSEQUENTLY FILED QUIET TITLE ACTION SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED WITH THIS CASE. 
Developer made Bountiful City a third-party defendant to 
this case, asserting Bountiful City "owned" the right-of-way. 
(R. 37-38) 
Bountiful City filed an answer admitting that assertion. 
(R. 343-345) 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the 
joinder of parties needed for just adjudication of a subject 
matter. 
Developer, Bountiful City or Vaughns could have joined 
anyone else whose presence was considered necessary for a proper 
determination of the issue of ownership rights in the 
staff/right-of-way area of Lot 8. 
Several months after this case was filed third-party 
defendant Bountiful City filed a separate quiet title action. 
(See R. 369-375) 
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Rule 42(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(a) Consolidation, When actions involving a 
common question of law or fact are pending before the 
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or 
all the matters in issue in the action; it may order 
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such 
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid an unnecessary costs or delay. 
This case presented just the kind of case contemplated by 
Rule 42(a). The same subject matter was presented by this case 
and also by the City's separate quiet title action — the legal 
rights in the staff/right-of-way portion of Lot 8. 
Vaughns filed a motion to consolidated the two cases. (R. 
369-375) 
The granting of the motion, which the court denied, would 
have saved all parties the time, trouble and expense of 
proceeding with two actions at the same time — one on appeal and 
the other proceeding at the trial level. 
Rule 42(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(b) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate 
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any 
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims or issues. 
Under this rule the court could have ordered a separate 
proceeding as to the title issues after dealing with the contract 
issues. 
Under the circumstances of this case the trial courts denial 
of Vaughns' Motion for Consolidation was an abuse of discretion. 
See Page v. Utah Home Fire Inc. Co., 391 P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). 
CONCLUSION 
1. Because the undisputed facts show Developers rejected 
Vaughns rescission effort, insisted on contract performance and 
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Vaughns consented thereto and requested return of Vaughns' check 
mutually agreed rescission did not occur as a matter of law. 
Rejecting Vaughns rescission effort and promising and electing 
contract performance, action upon Vaughns relied, estopped 
Developer from later purporting to accept rescission. By that 
conduct, Developer waived Developer's right to accept contract 
rescission. This court should rule on the matter as a matter of 
law since the legal effect of documents and the conduct of 
contracting parties is subject to review under a correctness 
standard. 
2. Developer's actions before the Bountiful City Council 
and action in entering into the contract with Vaughns under which 
Developer specifically acknowledged Vaughns legal title to the 
staff portion of Lot 8, and Vaughns reliance thereon, estopped 
Developer from later denying Vaughns legal title as a purported 
basis for rescission and constituted waiver of such right. Since 
the facts are undisputed, this court should rule on the effect of 
such actions as a matter of law. 
3. Developer's failure to act promptly to rescind and late 
action in taking possession of and cutting a road through the 
staff portion of Lot 8 constituted affirming, obtaining and 
keeping the benefit of the contract — action preventing 
restoration of Vaughns to their pre-contract position and 
precluded Developer from rescission. Since the facts with 
respect thereto are undisputed, this court should rule on the 
effect of such action as a matter of law. 
4. Developer's legal opinion of Vaughns legal rights does 
not constitute a "mutual mistake of fact" justifying rescission 
and this court should so rule as a matter of law. 
5. This court should hold that Vaughns were entitled to a 
ruling on the estoppel, waiver, election to proceed with the 
contract issues and on the issue of Vaughns' legal title to the 
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staff portion of Lot 8 matters presented by Vaughns' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
6. This court should hold that Bountiful City's 
subsequently filed quiet title action should have been 
consolidated with this case under Rule 42(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
7. This court should reverse the ruling and order of the 
lower court, hold contract rescission did not occur as a matter 
of law and that Developer is estopped from challenging Vaughns 
legal title to the staff right-of-way portion of Lot 8. 
8. The court should reverse the dismissal of the case, 
rule that the subsequently filed quiet title action should have 
been consolidated with this proceeding, reverse the denial of 
Vaughns' Motion to Consolidate and remand the case to the lower 
court for further proceedings on the remaining contract issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /\/j f~ day of August, 1995. 
( David S.A Cook 
Attorney for Appellants Robert L, 
and G. Jeanie Vaughn 
Served the foregoing by delivering two copies thereof to 
Bryce D. Panzer/ Blackburn & Stoll, L.C., Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents, Kent A. Hoggan and Maple Oaks, L.C., 77 
West 200 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to 
Russell L. Mahan, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant Bountiful 
City, 790 South 100 East, Bountiful, Utah 84010 this A<^r day 
of August, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM I 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED 
JANUARY 6, 1995. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. VAUGHN and G. JEANIE 
VAUGHN, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
KENT A. HOGGAN and MAPLE OAKS, 
L.C., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940700296 
The Court heard oral argument in this matter on December 13, 1994 at 2:30 p.m. and 
has reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In addition, the Court has also reviewed the other documents on file with the 
Court. Having done so, and now being fully advised, the Court enters the following findings 
and ruling: 
1. The Court finds that on or about November 8, 1990, Robert L. Vaughn and G. 
Jeanie Vaughn (hereinafter Plaintiffs), acquired Lot 8, Indian Springs Subdivision Plat "A", by 
Special Warranty Deed from Zions First National Bank. 
2. That on or about March 9, 1994, Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Kent 
A. Hoggan and Maple Oaks, L.C. (hereinafter Defendants). The primary objective of said 
agreement was to provide additional access to Maple Oaks' development across property 
believed to be owned by Plaintiffs (hereinafter flag staff portion of Lot 8). 
3. That pursuant to the said agreement, Defendants agreed inter alia to pay 
Plaintiffs $5,000.00 on or before April 10, 1994, in consideration for Plaintiffs agreeing to 
sign Defendants' Highland Estates Subdivision Plat, which plat proposed to be recorded so 
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that the flag staff portion of Lot 8 would be dedicated to the Bountiful City as a public street. 
In addition, Defendants also agreed inter alia to exercise reasonable good faith efforts 
to cause or to encourage Bountiful City to issue Plaintiffs a building permit, wherein 
Bountiful City would approve the proposed alterations in the elevation of the proposed street 
so that the Plaintiffs proposed driveway exit onto said proposed street would comply with 
Bountiful City's maximum slope requirement without requiring the elevation of Plaintiffs' 
driveway to be altered. 
4. That Bountiful City required a $75,000.00 bond for road and related off-site 
improvements before it would issue Plaintiffs a building permit. 
5. That Defendants did not post the foregoing off-site improvement completion 
bond with Bountiful City as it was required to do pursuant to its agreement with Plaintiffs. 
6. That as a direct result of Defendants' failure to post said bond by August 15, 
1994, Plaintiffs, on or about August 16, 1994, sent a letter to Defendants which stated in 
relevant part as follows: "[fjherefore, at the request of Robert L. and G. Jean Vaughn, 
herewith is the Vaughn's check no. 5026 in the sum of $5,000.00, constituting return of the 
sum you [Plaintiffs] paid Vaughns pursuant to the referenced Agreement. Said Agreement is 
hereby declared rescinded for breach on your part." See Letter from David S. Cook to Kent 
A. Hoggan and Maple Oaks, L.L.C., dated August 16, 1994. 
7. That on or about September 8, 1994, Plaintiffs subsequently acknowledged 
their aforementioned rescission by stating the following: M[t]he unexplained delay at that point 
suggested your client could well fail to post the bond by August 15, so it appeared Vaughns 
building alternative would be to rescind the agreement for nonperformance on your clients 
part . . . ." See Letter from David S. Cook to Bryce D. Panzer, dated September 8, 1994, 
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attached as Exhibit H to the Affidavit of David S. Cook. 
8. That Plaintiffs and Defendants did not thereafter reach any subsequent 
agreement and did not do anything that revived the March 9, 1994 agreement. 
9. That despite continued settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs at no time withdrew 
or attempted to withdraw their August 16, 1994 rescission. Moreover, Defendants never 
attempted to revive the March 9, 1994 agreement by returning the $5,000.00 to Plaintiffs that 
Defendants were originally obligated to pay Plaintiffs under the terms of the agreement. 
10. That on August 16, 1994, at the time of said rescission, both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants were restored to their respective pre-contract positions. Indeed, notwithstanding 
Defendants' later decision to cut a road on the flag portion of Lot 8, Defendants' action 
ensued after their previous agreement with Plaintiffs had been rescinded by Plaintiffs. Thus, 
the Court finds that Defendants' action in cutting a road on the flag portion of Lot 8 was not 
premised upon the March 9, 1994 agreement. Rather, the Court finds that Defendants' action 
in cutting a road on the flag portion of Lot 8 was based on Defendants' belief, mistaken or 
otherwise, that Plaintiffs in fact did not own any interest in said flag portion after all. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court finds that the foregoing undisputed facts 1-10 establish that a 
valid rescission of the March 9, 1994 agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants occurred 
on August 16, 1994. See Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.5 (Utah 1987) ("rescission at 
law . . . is completed when, having grounds justifying rescission, one party to a contract 
notifies the other party that he intends to rescind the contract and returns that which he 
received under the contract"). 
Thus, based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for 
47 
Summary Judgment should be granted. However, the Court notes that this ruling is limited 
only to Plaintiffs contract claims brought in the instant case and in no way precludes Plaintiff 
from filing other non-contract claims at a later time. 
Dated January 6, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the 
of January, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David S. Cook 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(,* 
Bryce D. Panzer 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'Jul/ &. 
Michael D. Di Reda 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
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ADDENDUM II 
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE; (3) 
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES; (4) GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIMS AND 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS; AND (5) DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
AGAINST JOHN DOES 1-5 DATED MARCH 29, 1995. 
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BRYCE D. PANZER (A2509) 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
. < * * 
M Jf Y^  
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. VAUGHN and G. JEANIE 
VAUGHN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENT A. HOGGAN, MAPLE OAKS, 
L.C., and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
MAPLE OAKS, L.C., 
Third-party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
ORDER: (1) GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
CONSOLIDATE; (3) DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES; (4) GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF 
COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT; and (5) 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
AGAINST JOHN DOES 1-5 
Civil No. 940700296 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Third-Party Defendant. 
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Pending motions and objections in this matter came on regularly for hearing on March 
7, 1995, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District Court 
Judge, presiding. David S. Cook appeared on behalf of plaintiffs, Bryce D. Panzer of 
Blackburn & Stoll, LC, appeared on behalf of the defendants Kent A. Hoggan and Maple 
Oaks, L.C, and Russell L. Malian appeared on behalf of the third-party defendant, Bountiful 
City. Having considered the motions, memoranda, and arguments of counsel, the Court 
having heretofore issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
January 6, 1995, and the Court having stated its further rulings and reasons therefore on the 
record in open court, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' objections to the form of the order submitted by Defendants with 
respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are hereby overruled. In view of the 
further rulings by the Court, however, the Court's formal order on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is set forth in this order. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs' 
contract claims and Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, as to 
Defendants Kent A. Hoggan and Maple Oaks, L.C. This Order shall not, however, preclude 
Plaintiffs from filing other non-contract claims against Defendants at a later time in a 
separate action. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Consolidation of this action with City of Bountiful v. 
Vaughns, etal.. Civil No. 94-0700375-QT, is hereby denied. 
4. Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees is hereby denied. 
52 
5. Defendants' Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaims and Third-Party 
Complaint is hereby granted, and said claims are hereby dismissed, without prejudice. 
6. Plaintiffs' remaining claims against John Does 1-5 are hereby dismissed, 
without prejudice. 
7. The Court intends this order to be a final judgment, which disposes of all of 
the claims between all of the parties. 
8. The parties shall bear their own costs incurred herein. 
DATED this j f l Hay of J T W c k . , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Jon M. Memmott 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Bryce D. %rzer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-y/^/^S' 
David S. Cook 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Russell L. Mahan 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
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